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ABSTRACT
Volatility in exchange rates is a prominent feature of open economies, a fact which has
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literature. But it identifies other cases, not considered previously, in which these effects can be
significantly larger. These include habit persistence, where agents are more sensitive to risk, and
also incomplete asset market structures which allow for asymmetries between countries. The latter
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or members of the euro zone, may accrue significant benefits because of the enhanced ability to
hedge against exchange rate risk.
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1   Introduction 
  Exchange rate variability is one of the most prominent features of open economy 
macroeconomics, and a desire to moderate this variability has been a motivation behind the 
managed exchange rate regimes of many countries as well as European monetary union. This 
paper conducts a model -consistent evaluation of optimal monetary polic y rules in the context 
of a two-country general equilibrium model with sticky prices. It focuses on two questions. 
Firstly, what degree of exchange rate variability or stabilization is optimal for certain classes 
of economies? Secondly, for what types of economies does following an optimized 
stabilization policy yield the most significant benefits in terms of household utility?  
  Several recent papers have employed analytically solvable models to characterize the 
implications of alternative monetary policy rules and exchange rate arrangements in sticky 
price open economies. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000) demonstrate that monetary policy 
rules that stabilize the exchange rate do not necessarily increase household welfare or even 
trade, depending on the nature of preferences, the monetary policy rules, and the shocks. 
Devereux and Engel (2003) show that the degree to which optimal policy lets the exchange 
rate fluctuate depends on the currency in which prices are sticky.  Gali and Monacelli (2005) 
study classes of policy rules in the form of inflation targeting and Taylor-type rules.
1 
  This paper conducts a quantitative analysis of somewhat richer and more realistic 
economic environments, as permitted by calibration and numerical solution. For example, 
asset markets and preferences are not limited to cases that imply complete international risk 
sharing, which would imply the current account is restricted to zero balance. As a result, 
when the paper computes the effects of exchange rate variability, it takes into consideration 
the potentially important effects that exchange rates have on a country’s current account.  
This numerical analysis is made possible by the second-order solution method developed in 
Kim et. al. (2004), which is also applied to an open economy setting in Kollmann (2002) and 
(2004).
2 The analysis here differs from Kollmann in that it studies alternative economic 
environments, and pays special attention to the size of quantitative implications from policy 
choices. 
                                                 
1 For a sample of other related work, see Benigno (2004), Benigno and Benigno (2003), Carre and Collard 
(2003), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001, 2004), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), 
Sutherland (2005).  
2 Related solution algorithms have been proposed in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a), and Collard and 
Juillard (2001).    2 
      The paper begins by studying a generalized version of the standard model from the 
optimal policy literature, with calibrated parameters and augmented with incomplete asset 
markets. Experiments support the findings from simpler analytical models, in that the 
particular Taylor-type policy rule that is optimal prescribes aggressively stabilizing inflation. 
The optimized rule does not directly respond to exchange rate fluctuations, and it is optimal 
to let the exchange rate fluctuate in response to productivity shocks. However, the 
experiment highlights that the benefits from following an optimized stabilization policy are 
small in terms of representative household utility.  
  The paper goes on to study two new types of economic environments, where the 
utility benefits might be expected to be larger. The first of these cases is where household 
preferences exhibit habits. However, experiments indicate that the conclusions from the 
benchmark economy are little altered. Optimized policy continues to focus on inflation 
stabilization, and continues to allow substantial exchange rate variability. Further, while 
households with habits are by definition much more sensitive to certain types of variability, 
the utility gains from following an optimized stabilization policy increase only moderately.  
  The second alternative economic environment features one country unable to issue 
debt denominated in its own currency. Termed “original sin” in recent literature, this asset 
asymmetry makes it difficult for the country to respond to a stochastic environment through 
precautionary saving, since net foreign assets expose the country all the more to the effects of 
exchange rate variability. In this context the optimized cooperative policy rule puts 
substantial weight on exchange rate stabilization and virtually eliminates exchange rate 
fluctuations. The size of the utility gain for the sin country is about four times that for the 
benchmark economy above.  
  The next section of the paper presents the benchmark two-country model, calibration, 
and solution method. Section 3 presents results for the benchmark model and the two 
extensions. Section 4 concludes and makes suggestions for future research. 
 
2 The Model 
  Consider a model of two countries, denoted home and foreign. Agents consume two 
final goods, where each country specializes in the production of one of these. 
Monopolistically competitive firms produce intermediates using capital and labor, and set 
prices sluggishly due to adjustment costs.   3 
 
2.1   Goods market structure   
  Final goods (F) are a CES index over sub-indexes of the home (FH) and foreign (FF) 
intermediates. The aggregation technology for final goods is: 
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where a lower case represents output of the individual firms. 
  Final goods producers behave competitively, maximizing profit each period: 
  ,,,, max tttHtHtFtFt PFPFPF Øø P=-- ºß    (4) 
where P is the overall price index of the final good, PH is the price index of home goods in 
home currency units, and PF of foreign goods in foreign currency units. The price indexes 
may be defined: 
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Given the aggregation functions above, demand will be allocated between home and foreign 
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with demands for individual goods: 
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Analogous definitions apply to the foreign country. 
 
2.2  Home household problem    4 
  The representative home household derives utility from consumption (C), real money 
balances (M/P), and labor (H). Households derive income by selling their labor (H) at the 
nominal wage rate (W), renting out capital to firms at the real rental rate (r), receiving real 
profits from home firms (P), and from government transfers (T). In addition to money, 
households can hold a noncontingent nominal bond denominated in home currency (BH) 
which pays an interest rate (i), or a bond denominated in foreign currency (BF) which pays an 
interest rate (
* i ), where S is the home currency price of a unit of foreign currency. The 
household determines capital accumulation (K), which involves a quadratic adjustment cost 
that depends upon the parameter  I y  and a constant rate of depreciation (d ). 
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subject to the budget constraint: 
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Money demand shocks are represented by shifts in  t c . There is a small adjustment cost on 
bond holdings, ACB, to ensure stationarity in the net foreign asset position.
3 Later sections of 
the paper will consider a more general form of preferences featuring habits. Later sections 
also consider an alternative asset market structure, limited to only one type of bond. 
  Optimization implies a money demand equation: 
                                                 
3 Home and foreign bonds are treated separately in this adjustment cost to ensure that there exists a 
determinate allocation between home and foreign currency bonds even in a first-order approximation to the 
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an interest parity condition: 
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and finally 
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equating the benefits and costs of capital accumulation. An analogous problem and first order 
conditions apply to the foreign household. 
 
 
2.3  Home firm problem   
  The benchmark model assumes producer currency pricing, so that firms set prices in 
their own currency both for sales domestically and sales abroad. They rent capital (K) at the 
rental rate r, and hire labor (H) at the nominal rate W. Prices are sticky because there is a 
quadratic cost to adjusting them. The home firm maximization problem is: 
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with the adjustment and marginal costs defined respectively as:    6 
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and subject to the demand function for fH,t(i) from above and the production function 
specifying output (y(i)) as: 
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Here  t q  represents technology common to all production firms in the country, and is subject 
to shocks. Lastly,  , ttn x +  is the pricing kernel used to value random date t+n payoffs. Since 
firms are owned by the representative household, they are assumed to value future profits 
according to the household's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption, so 




ttnCtntnCtt UPUP xb +++ = . An analogous problem applies to the foreign firm. 
  The optimization problem implies a trade-off between capital and labor inputs that 
depends on the relative cost of each: 
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and price setting behavior: 
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Note that in the special case of no price stickiness ( P y =0), price-setting is set as a 





. But in the presence of price 
adjustment costs, price-setting will deviate from this simple markup because of several 
additional terms. First, the resource cost of setting a price (ACP) should be included along 
with the cost of production when computing the overall price of bringing a good to market. 
The next term in the expression above reflects the backward looking component of price 
setting: firms are reluctant to make large changes in price due to the marginal adjustment cost.   7 
The final term reflects the forward-looking component of price setting. If a firm expects the 
need to change prices further in the next period, it will tend to change the price more today, 
to minimize future adjustment costs. Further, there is an additional reason to raise prices 
today, because a higher current price means that any future changes will be a smaller 
percentage change. Here we see one reason for the monopolist to set a higher price on 
average, as a hedge against future price changes. Finally, note that in the symmetric 
equilibrium  ( ) ,, HtHt piP = . 
 
2.4  Government 
  Model  experiments will consider three alternative policy rules. The first specifies a 
fixed exogenous money supply: 
  1 tt MM - = .                                                   (27) 
This rule will be used as a benchmark for later comparisons, as it implies no endogenous 
response of policy to economic shocks or circumstances. The second rule pegs the exchange 
rate:  
  t SS = .                                                  (28) 
The third rule is a Taylor-type interest rate setting rule 
  ˆ
ttYtst iiYs pp =+G+G+GD                                                  (29) 
where i is steady state interest rate,  t p  is inflation rate,  ( ) ˆ
tt YYYY =- is the output gap, and  
t s D  is the percentage change in the nominal exchange rate.
 4 It is assumed that central banks 
make a commitment to set these parameters at time-invariant values. 
  The government's budget constraint is: 
  1 ttt TMM - =- .                                                (30) 
 
2.5  Market clearing and equilibrium 
  Market clearing for the home goods market requires: 
 
*
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and for the home bond market: 
                                                 
4 For the foreign country’s rule, the response coefficient to the exchange rate is the negative of that for the 
home country.   8 
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Total home final goods demand must equal final goods supply: 
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The home balance of payments condition may be written: 
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  Equilibrium is a set of 37 sequences: 
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** ,,, tttt MMii. The 37 equilibrium conditions are comprised of the balance of payments 
constraint (34) and the following 18 equations combined with their analogous foreign 
counterparts: the definition of total demand (1), demand conditions for home and foreign 
goods (8 and 9), the overall price index (5), the price setting rule (26), the money supply rule 
(27, 28 or 29), labor supply condition (15), capital -labor trade-off (25), money demand 
condition (14), the interest rate parity condition (18), production function (24), definition of 
marginal cost (23), definition of total demand (33), definition of d (17), consumption Euler 
equation (16), market cl earing conditions for goods (31) and bonds (32), and capital 
accumulation (19). 
  The shocks, to technology and money demand in each country, will be log-normally 
distributed: 
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  To deal with the nonstationary nominal variables in this system, they will be 
transformed by dividing by their respective national price level. The nominal exchange rate 
will be dealt with in first differences in those cases where it is nonstationary in levels.
5 
 
                                                 
5 The exchange rate is stationary under the fixed exchange rate rule (28) and the exogenous money supply 
rule with no shocks to money supply (27).    9 
2.6  Solution method and welfare measure 
  The model is solved numerically to a second order approximation.  See Kim et al . 
(2003) or Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) for a detailed explanation of the methodology. 
This contrasts with the more standard method relying upon log-linear approximations of 
model equations, which would only capture the direct effects of exchange rate variability on 
utility through the fact that people dislike variance in consumption and leisure. A second 
order approximation to the full set of model equations additionally picks up the effects of 
variability on the means of consumption and leisure and hence utility. For example , firms 
may hedge against exchange rate variability by setting higher prices and lowering mean 
output, and households may engage in precautionary saving that affects mean consumption. 
  Although it is an imperfect measurement of welfare, we follow the literature in using 
a second order Taylor expansion of the utility function of a representative household around 
the deterministic steady state, indicated here by overbars.
6 Using unconditional expectations: 
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The unconditional loss is measured in terms of the share (u) of additional deterministic steady 
state consumption needed to equate the utility level of the unconditional expectation under 
uncertainty, defined above, with the deterministic steady state:  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1,, tt UuCHEUCH += .  (37) 
This effect can be decomposed into the part due to the variance of uncertain consumption and 
leisure, and the part due to the effect of uncertainty on the means of these variables: 
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  Tables also report conditional utility measures, which have the advantage of taking 
into consideration the transition dynamics following the implementation of a new policy rule. 
To compare the implications of adopting the set of alternative policy rules, the utility level is 
tracked as it starts out from the unconditional expectation implied by the exogenous money 
supply rule defined above, and evolves over time in response to the alternative rule under 
consideration. Utility implications are summarized analogously to the unconditional formulas 
                                                 
6True welfare analysis is hampered by well-known problems of aggregation. As is standard in this literature, 
this paper determines optimal policy in a model-consistent manner by maximizing the utility of a 
representative household.    10 
above, except that it is the discounted sum of expected utilities over time rather than the 
unconditional expectation that is reported. For example, the overall effect is computed:  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 0 1,1,
conditionalt
tt t UuCHEUCH bb
¥
= +=-￿ .  (40) 
  To solve for the reaction parameters in the policy rule (29) that are optimal, the sum 
of home and foreign unconditional utility level s is maximized.  Since the benchmark case is 
symmetric, this is a fairly simple matter of choosing three policy parameters,  p G ,  Y G , and  S G , 
which we accomplish by grid search.
7 
 
2.7  Calibration 
  Regarding behavioral parameters, the labor supply elasticity is set at unity ( 1 y = ), 
following Christiano at. al. (1997). Following Bergin and Feenstra (2001), we set  4 er ==, 
implying an interest elasticity of real money balances of 0.25 and an income elasticity of 
unity. Following estimates of the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods 
in Harrigan (1993) and Trefler and Lai (1999),  m  is set at 5. A value of  7 l =  implies an 
average price mark-up of 16%. The share of home goods in the home final goods aggregator, 
a, is set at 0.80, reflecting the 20% share of imports in GDP on average for the G7 countries 
in the 1990:1-1998:4 period.   0.99 b = , where a period in the model is one quarter. For the 
depreciation rate,  0.025 d = , and for the capital share in production  0.36 a = . 
  Regarding adjustment costs,  50 P y = , which implies that 95% of the price has 
adjusted 4 periods after a monetary shock. Investment adjustment cost,  4 I y = , is calibrated 
such that investment is about three times more volatile than output. A small bond adjustment 
cost (
6 410 B x y
- = ) is necessary to avoid a unit root associated with the incompleteness of the 
asset markets. 
   Regarding shocks, the variance and persistence of the technology shock is calibrated 
at standard values:  ( ) ( )
*2
11 varvar0.01 ee ==  and 
*
11 0.90 rr == , common values in the real 
business cycle literature. Money demand shocks are calibrated to replicate the variability and 
serial correlation of data on the bilateral exchange rate between the U.S. and remaining G7, 
                                                 
7 Search grids ranged from 1 to 5 for  p G , and from 0 to 5 for  Y G  and  S G , with step size 0.25.   11 
HP filtered, for the period 1973:1 - 2000:4.
8 To replicate these moments in the benchmark 
model for the exchange rate in levels form requires the calibration  ( ) ( )
*2
22 varvar0.03 ee ==  
and 
*
11 0.99 rr == . For simplicity the shocks are specified as uncorrelated across countries. 
 
3  Results 
3.1  Benchmark model 
  Table 1 reports the results for the three types of policy rules. The optimized Taylor 
rule stresses inflation targeting, with inflation response p G  = 5.0, and with no effort to 
stabilize output or the exchange rate ( Y G  = 0.0,  S G  = 0.0).
9  This policy neutralizes the 
effects of money demand shocks, calling for shifts in money supply that accommodate shifts 
in money demand. And it responds procyclically to technology shocks, calling for a lower 
interest rate and higher money growth rate in the periods shortly following a productivity 
increase. This result corresponds to previous findings in the literature using simpler models 
(Devereux and Engel, 2003; Gali and Monacelli, 2005).  Sticky prices prevent output and 
employment from rising fully in response to a rise in productivity, and a monetary expansion 
helps remedy this shortcoming.  
  Of special interest here is the implication of the optimal rule for exchange rate 
variability. Table 1 shows that while a large portion of exchange rate variance is offset, it is 
not optimal to eliminate all exchange rate variability. Impulse responses show that while the 
conditional variability following money demand shocks is fully eliminated, the monetary 
policy response to productivity shocks induces exchange rate fluctuations. This reflects the 
finding in preceding literature using simpler models, where exchange rate movements can 
help compensate for price stickiness, by promoting adjustment in international relative prices 
to productivity shocks. Figure 1 plots the dynamic response of the exchange rate to a 1% rise 
in home country productivity. The story above is reflected in a substantial home currency 
depreciation in the initial periods after the shock. But the dynamics also indicate there is a 
                                                 
8 While the search for an adequate theoretical explanation for exchange rate variability is itself the subject 
of ongoing research, the approach taken here follows on the example of the literature discussed in the 
introduction; Devereux and Engel (2003) and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000) each use money demand 
or money supply shocks to generate exchange rate variability. Bergin (2003) offers some empirical support 
for this approach. 
9 As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b) we found that the inflation parameter is at the upper bound of the 
range considered in the grid search. Allowing yet higher values of this parameter appears to have negligible 
effects on the equilibrium.    12 
long-run currency appreciation implied by this rule following productivity gains.
10 As this 
implies a significant nonstationary component to the exchange rate movement, the table 
reports the variability for exchange rate depreciations rather than for the exchange rate level. 
  The table shows that the optimized policy rule eliminates any extra price markup 
ratio present under exogenous money supply and under the fixed exchange rate rules.  This 
helps explain why the mean levels of output and consumption are higher under the optimized 
rule relative to the exogenous money rule (by 0.06% and 0.05%, respectively). This rule also 
raises unconditional utility of the representative household, by the equivalent of 0.07% of 
steady state consumption. The fixed exchange rate case is also inferior to the optimized rule, 
with lower output, consumption and utility. In particular, if this economy fixes the exchange 
rate, it lowers utility by 0.04% relative to the optimal policy.   
  While the optimal policy does generate positive gains relative to both alternatives 
here, it is worth noting that these gains are small in magnitude. As a useful comparison, 
Lucas (1987) measured the costs of business cycle fluctuations at 0.04% of annual 
consumption, concluding that this was trivial. Lastly, we note that results based on 
conditional rather than unconditional measures are similar to those presented above. 
  The analysis of the benchmark model above indicates that some of the basic 
conclusions drawn in preceding literature in the context of simpler models continue to hold in 
the context of a more richly specified and more realistically calibrated model. However, a 
second lesson is that the gains in terms of utility remain quite small.  The following two 
sections will consider further extensions to the basic model. 
 
3.2  Habits 
  Past research on household consumption and asset choices has found that habits may 
be an essential part of household preferences.
 11 Given that this literature has found 
households to be quite sensitive to variability in domestic equity markets, one might also 
expect them to be sensitive to variability in international asset markets. Yet research 
analyzing optimal monetary policy and exchange rate stabilization to date has not been able 
to consider this potentially important feature because it precludes the usual analytical solution.  
                                                 
10 Gali and Monacelli (2005) find a very similar permanent appreciation is implied by the various Taylor 
rules they consider. 
11 See for example Constantinides (1990) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) regarding the equity 
premium puzzle, and see Deaton (1987) and Fuhrer (2000) for a discussion in the context of consumption 
behavior.   13 
    To include habits in the model, we consider the utility function: 
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which implies an intertemporal Euler equation:
12 
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As g  goes to unity, households act to smooth changes in consumption rather than the level of 
consumption. We calibrate the habit persistence parameter at g = 0.8, which is approximately 
what Deaton (1987) and Constantinides (1990) require in order to explain aggregate 
consumption smoothness and the equity premium puzzle. 
  While it is common in calibrating habit persistence models to impose a large 
investment adjustment cost to keep the standard deviation of consumption from falling to 
implausibly low levels, this device does not work in an open economy where international 
borrowing breaks the link between domestic investment and saving. Instead we augment the 
bond adjustment cost in the household budget constraint to penalize large changes in asset 
holding as well as large levels: 
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Where  2 B y is calibrated at 9x10
-4. 
  Results are reported in Table 2. The optimal policy parameters are the same as in the 
benchmark model above. It remains optimal to respond aggressively to stabilize the inflation 
rate, with no response to the exchange rate. Further the optimal degree of variability of the 
exchange rate remains essentially the same as above, both in terms of unconditional variance, 
and in terms of the conditional response to shocks, as depicted in Figure 1.  
  The welfare gains from optimal stabilization policy are increased slightly relative to 
the benchmark model. The optimized rule raises unconditional utility by the consumption 
equivalent of 0.13% relative to the exogenous money rule , which is around double the gain in 
the context of the benchmark economy.  In contrast, the representative household in this 
habits economy would be willing to trade a more sizeable 0.66% of steady state consumption 
if it were possible to eliminate all shocks from the economy, an amount which is more than 
                                                 
12 The welfare formula is of course updated with the second order expansion of the new utility function.   14 
four times that in the benchmark economy. So even if habits indicate that households are 
more concerned about certain types of variability, it appears that monetary policy has a 
limited ability to influence this impact on utility. 
 
3.3 “original sin” in asset markets 
  The implications of exchange rate variability can be shaped also by the structure of a 
country's asset market. Eichengreen et al. (2005) has noted that perceptions in the 
international capital market make it impossible for many countries to issue international debt 
denominated in their own national currency. Given that such perceptions of untrustworthiness 
may well be beyond the control of the country to change, but simply are a feature of the 
international capital market, the authors have termed this condition “original sin.” 
  To study this feature, consider a version of the model where there is only one 
nominal bond that is traded internationally, denominated in the currency of the home country. 
This returns to the benchmark model above, except that BFt is set to zero in all periods. The 
home country in this model certainly is relevant for those countries whose currencies have 
the status of reserve currencies, such as the U.S., Japan, and EMU countries. And the foreign 
country in the model is relevant to some degree for any of the remaining countries, and most 
especially for developing countries. 
  Table 3 indicates that the equilibrium in the “original sin” model under the exogenous 
money supply policy is quite different from that in the benchmark model. The stochastic 
steady state deviations for endogenous variables are often a full order of magnitude larger. 
Further, they are asymmetric across countries, with consumption higher in the home country 
but lower abroad, and vice versa for production levels. Some intuition for this effect can be 
found by noting the large asymmetry in asset holdings, with net bond holdings by the home 
country rising 60% relative to the benchmark case, and hence that of the foreign country 
falling  by 60%. This finding is precisely the inverse of that found by Kollmann (2002) in a 
small open economy model with a similar asset structure. That model indicated that the 
presence of uncertainty raised the desire for precautionary saving, which rai sed wealth and 
hence consumption. We show that moving from a small open economy to a two country 
general equilibrium model reverses this result. The distinction is that a small open economy 
model assumes only agents in the small economy respond to the presence of shocks, while 
assuming the saving behavior of agents in the rest of the world and the equilibrium world 
interest rate are exogenous and remain unaffected.     15 
In contrast, a two-country environment makes clear that if uncertainty encourages 
saving behavior of all households in the world, the world interest rate on bonds must fall to 
balance an excess demand for bonds. The presence of this effect in our model is confirmed 
by the fall in the interest rate in column 1 of Table 3. In equilibrium the demand and supply 
of bonds are held equal by having the home (non sin) country save more while the foreign 
(sin) country saves less. This appears to be due to an asymmetry in the saving options facing 
the two countries. Recall that the foreign country cannot accumulate a net positive asset 
position in its own currency. It may be that accumulating assets is a less attractive hedge 
against uncertainty, when the accumulation of foreign currency assets itself may increase 
exposure to the uncertainty of exchange rate fluctuations. As a result, the interest rate falls 
enough to more than compensate for the desired increase in precautionary saving in the sin 
country, and in equilibrium it holds fewer bonds.  
  A fixed exchange rate policy substantially offsets the asymmetries above. As column 
2 indicates, the asymmetry in asset holdings is reduced by over two-thirds. Further, an 
optimized Taylor rule policy comes close to replicating the fixed exchange rate regime. 
When policy parameters are chosen to maximize the sum of home and foreign utility, as 
shown in column 3, the optimal exchange rate response is at the upper bound of the search 
grid and the response to inflation is reduced compared to previous cases ( p G  = 2.0, S G  = 
5.0).
13 As a result, the unconditional standard deviation of the exchange rate is reduced to 
only 0.02%, and the conditional response of the exchange rate to productivity shocks is 
nearly completed dampened, as shown in Figure 1. Further, if one chooses policy parameters 
to maximize just the utility of the sin country alone, the response to inflation is reduced yet a 
bit further ( p G  = 1.25, S G  = 5.0), leading to even greater exchange rate stabilization (as 
shown in column 4). 
14 Each country still offsets its own money demand shocks under these 
rules, even more so, as policy works to dampen the currency appreciation proceeding from a 
rise in money demand. Policy continues to respond procyclically to a productivity shock by 
lowering interest rates, but the degree of inflation stabilization is smaller under these policy 
rules. 
                                                 
13 The grid search above is restricted to policy parameters symmetric across countries, implying that both 
countries work jointly to stabilize their bilateral exchange rate. Nonetheless, some ancillary experiments 
here with unilateral pegs indicated that the welfare of the foreign country can fall if it alone has  S G >0. 
14 Figure 1 does not plot the response for the policy rule optimized for foreign welfare, as this is nearly 
identical to that for joint welfare discussed above.   16 
  The gains from stabilization policy for the sin country are somewhat larger than in the 
previous cases studied. The second of the optimized policies discussed above raises 
unconditional foreign utility by 0.29% over the exogenous policy, more than four times the 
gain from policy observed under the benchmark model.
 15 The gains occur entirely in the 
mean component of utility, reflecting the effect of variability on the means of endogenous 
variables, rather than in the variance component itself. The gain is even a bit larger under the 
fixed exchange rate rule (0.33%), suggesting that the gains from the optimized policy rule 
observed here are due to stabilizing the exchange rate and moderating the resulting 
asymmetries.  We think this experiment is informative, indicating that economies of this type 
warrant further investigation in the theoretical literature. 
 
4  Conclusions 
  This paper performs a quantitative model-consistent evaluation of optimal policy 
rules in a two-country sticky-price model. The experiments focus on the important question 
of what degree of exchange rate variability is optimal for various types of open economies. 
The utility benefits of pursuing an optimized policy appear to be small for the types of simple 
economies typically studied in this literature. Developments in solving second-order 
approximations to dynamic stochastic models in principle open up the door to study much 
more varied and realistic economic environments.  
  The paper finds that extending the environment to consider consumer habits has only 
minor effects on the conclusions standard in the literature. It remains optimal to aggressively 
stabilize inflation, while allowing the exchange rate to fluctuate in response to productivity 
shocks. Further, the utility benefits of pursuing optimized stabilization rules remain quite small. 
In contrast, an extension of the environment to consider asset markets exhibiting ”original sin”, 
does alter these conclusions. Since ”original sin” appears to impose significant constraints on a 
country’s precautionary saving, it becomes optimal, both from the perspective of the two-
country world as well as from the sin country in particular, to actively suppress exchange rate 
fluctuations. These results would seem to indicate that it is alternative economic environments 
such as this one, which most warrant further investigation in the theoretical literature.  
                                                 
15 Note also that the conditional welfare effect is small despite the large unconditional effect. Adopting a 
new policy does not change the fact that the foreign economy is starting off with a low share of wealth. 
After the adoption of the new policy, the foreign country begins saving more, but this entails a lower 
consumption level during the lengthy transition period where it is building up its capital stock and assets.   17 
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Table 1: Benchmark Model 
 
     Exogenous    Fixed    Optimized flexible 
    money supply    exchange rate    exch. rate rule
3 
Standard deviations:          
 consumption    1.24    1.21    1.20 
 output    2.41    2.36    1.86 
 investment    5.09    5.09    4.93 
 inflation    0.70    0.48    0.02 
 exchange rate depr.    1.44    0.00    0.20 
          
Stochastic steady state deviations
1:       
 consumption    -0.036    -0.018    0.016 
 leisure    0.012    0.017    0.026 
 output    -0.015    0.007    0.046 
 capital stock    -0.034    0.023    0.108 
 interest rate    -1.481    -1.082    -0.324 
 markup ratio    0.341    0.215    0.001 
 home net assets    0.000    0.000    0.000 
 trade volume    0.299    0.256    0.277 
          
Unconditional welfare effects (as percentage of steady state consumption)
2: 
 u-overall    -0.144    -0.113    -0.070 
 u-variance    -0.099    -0.082    -0.067 
 u-mean    -0.046    -0.031    -0.003 
          
Conditional welfare effects (as percentage of steady state consumption)
2: 
 u-overall    -0.144    -0.129    -0.109 
 u-variance    -0.099    -0.087    -0.070 
 u-mean    -0.046    -0.042    -0.039 
1 Percent difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state. 
2 Difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state, shown as a 
share of deterministic steady state consumption. 
Foreign variables are identical to home in the cases shown here.  
3 The policy rule is  ˆ 5.00.00.0 tttt iiYs p =+++D .  20 
 
Table 2: Habit Persistence Model 
 
     Exogenous    Fixed   Optimized flexible 
    money supply    exchange rate    exch. rate rule
3 
Standard deviations:          
 consumption    1.25    1.24    1.25 
 output    1.41    1.41    1.39 
 investment    7.35    7.32    7.35 
 inflation rate    0.73    0.50    0.14 
 exchange rate depr.    1.20    0.00    0.23 
          
Stochastic steady state deviations
1:       
 consumption    0.018    0.023    0.030 
 leisure    -0.003    -0.013    -0.020 
 output    0.113    0.123    0.140 
 capital stock    0.513    0.571    0.630 
 interest rate    -8.235    -7.833    -8.560 
 markup ratio    0.360    0.186    0.020 
 home net assets    0.000    0.000    0.000 
 trade volume    0.576    0.561    0.570 
          
Unconditional welfare effects (as percentage of steady state consumption)
2: 
 u-overall    -0.659    -0.580    -0.530 
 u-variance    -0.692    -0.674    -0.680 
 u-mean    0.033    0.095    0.150 
            
Conditional welfare effects (as percentage of steady state consumption)
2: 
 u-overall    -0.659    -0.655    -0.636 
 u-variance    -0.692    -0.688    -0.683 
 u-mean    0.033    0.032    0.047 
1 Percent difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state. 
2 Difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state, shown as 
a share of deterministic steady state consumption. 
Foreign variables are identical to home in the cases shown here. 
3 The policy rule is  ˆ 5.00.00.0 tttt iiYs p =+++D .   21 
Table 3: Asymmetric Asset Market Model 
 
    Exogenous    Fixed    Optimized rule:   Optimized rule:  
    money supply    exchange rate    Joint welfare
3   Foreign welfare
4 
Standard deviations:                 
 consumption    1.31    1.28    1.36    1.34 
 output    1.67    1.69    1.71    1.71 
 investment    5.89    6.56    6.56    6.56 
 inflation rate    0.57    0.39    0.08    0.26 
 exchange rate depr.    1.04    0.00    0.02    0.01 
                 
Stochastic steady state deviations
1:             
 consumption (home)    0.157    0.079    0.122    0.109 
 consumption (foreign)    -0.137    -0.031    -0.041    -0.036 
 leisure (home)    -0.403    -0.088    -0.176    -0.148 
 leisure (foreign)    0.595    0.287    0.376    0.345 
 output (home)    -0.410    -0.094    -0.152    -0.130 
 output (foreign)    0.534    0.261    0.371    0.336 
 capital stock (home)    -0.389    -0.081    -0.086    -0.081 
 capital stock (foreign)    0.431    0.227    0.369    0.324 
 interest rate     -0.440    -0.218    -0.255    -0.477 
 markup ratio     0.139    0.070    0.003    0.015 
 home net assets    60.169    17.954    29.902    25.838 
 trade volume    1.051    0.861    0.924    0.903 
                 
Unconditional welfare effects (as percentage of steady state consumption)
2:   
 u-overall (home)    0.278    -0.030    0.079    0.046 
 u-overall (foreign)    -0.751    -0.416    -0.491    -0.462 
 u-variance    -0.177    -0.174    -0.173    -0.172 
 u-mean (home)    0.454    0.144    0.252    0.218 
 u-mean (foreign)    -0.575    -0.242    -0.318    -0.290 
                 
Conditional welfare effects (as percentage of steady state consumption)
2:   
 u-overall (home)    0.278    0.288    0.298    0.299 
 u-overall (foreign)    -0.751    -0.736    -0.733    -0.731 
 u-variance    -0.177    -0.171    -0.168    -0.168 
 u-mean (home)    0.454    0.458    0.466    0.466 
 u-mean (foreign)    -0.575    -0.565    -0.565    -0.564 
1 Percent difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state. 
2 Difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state, shown as a share of 
deterministic steady state consumption. 
3 The policy rule is ˆ 2.00.05.0 tttt iiYs p =+++D . 
4 The policy rule is ˆ 1.250.05.0 tttt iiYs p =+++D .   22 
  
 
Figure 1: Exchange rate impulse responses 
following home productivity shock 
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